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[T]he prison staff was unable to rescue the hostage. Because the
threatened hostage was the same person as the threating perpetrator, they could
not be separated. It was impossible to deny the perpetrator access to his hostage.
The defendants were left with the almost impossible task of trying to protect a
man from himself twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week . . . . Indeed, it
is the prison staff’s very concern for [their inmate’s] physical safety that, in
[their inmate’s] mind, gave him so much power over them.
²Judge William C. Griesbach1
I. INTRODUCTION
The deliberate indifference doctrine requires prisons and prison staff to
protect inmates from harm; the exact nature of the requirement is constantly
challenged, but it is especially tricky when the harm involved is self-imposed by
the inmate himself. Compare two prisoners. First, Matt Sanville.2 He has been
diagnosed with ³major depressive disorder, aggressive conduct disorder, bipolar
disorder, dysthymic disorder, adjustment disorder, mixed personality disorder,
and manic depression´ by various doctors throughout his life.3 Sanville died by
suicide in prison.4 Here¶s what led to his death: All of Sanville¶s doctors
unanimously agreed that he needed medication.5 In 1997, after Sanville decided
to stop taking medication, police arrested him for assaulting his mother.6
Although his mother and prosecutor agreed that Sanville was unthreatening when
medicated and should therefore not be incarcerated, the judge sent him to prison.7
During his incarceration, Sanville persuaded the prison doctor to discontinue
medication due to nausea and vomiting.8 Bizarre behavior followed, and Sanville
sent a letter home contemplating his imminent death.9 The prison staff reacted
by placing Sanville in solitary confinement; the State did nothing more, even

1
2
3
4
5
6

Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F. Supp. 2d 977, 933 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 728 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

7

Id. at 728±29. 7KHSURVHFXWRUVWDWHGDW6DQYLOOH¶VVHQWHQFLQJ³,GRQRWEHOLHYHWKDWVHQGLQJ
D SHUVRQ WR WKH :LVFRQVLQ6WDWH3ULVRQ V\VWHP LV WKHEHVW SODFH WR GHDO ZLWK D SHUVRQ¶V PHQWDO
LOOQHVV´Id. at 729.
8
Id. at 729.
9

Id. at 729± GHVFULELQJ6DQYLOOH¶VEL]DUUHEHKDYLRULQFOXGLQJZULWLQJWKUHDWVRQKLVVKHHWV
flushing clothes down the toilet, assaulting an inmate, and refusing food).
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when Sanville stopped eating.10 It did not take long before he died by suicide in
his cell.11
Now meet David Bowers.12 Bowers is currently incarcerated.13 Bowers¶s
doctors are less certain about his mental health than Sanville¶s doctors were²
while his record contains diagnoses such as intermittent explosive disorder, some
evaluators say he is ³not an individual who is mentally ill or intellectually
incompetent.´14 In 2005, Bowers was transferred from one prison to another to
complete a sentence for a drug crime.15 State healthcare providers have treated
Bowers¶s potential mental illness throughout his incarceration, but, despite the
treatment, Bowers has repeatedly engaged in self-harm.16 On multiple occasions,
he has threatened to engage in self-harm unless guards acquiesce to his
demands.17 Over time, state officials have concluded that the self-harm is
³manipulative and not psychotic.´18 Put differently, Bowers can control his selfharm.
Sanville and Bowers have much in common. Primarily, both prisoners
have suffered self-inflicted injuries that the State failed to prevent, opening the
door for prisoner civil±rights claims.19 Central to this Article, however, is the
glaring difference between the two inmates: the cause of their self-harm. On the
one hand, Sanville committed suicide because of his mental illness. On the other
hand, Bowers repeatedly engages in self-harm as a strategic and often successful
way to negotiate with prison staff. It would seem that Bowers should fail if he
brings a claim against the State under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because otherwise he
will be able to use the law to exploit the State. Yet, under the current law in some
circuits, Bowers¶s and Sanville¶s claims would likely be treated the same. Using
the Seventh Circuit as a case study, this Article argues that the two claims should
be treated differently under the deliberate indifference framework. Furthermore,
it argues that treating the claims the same makes the deliberate indifference

10
11
12
13
14
15

Id.
Id. at 731.
Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F. Supp. 2d 977, 978 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
Id.
Id. at 979 (citing a report prepared by a psychologist that analyzed Bowers in 1993).
Id.

16

Id.
Id. at 980, 989 (noting the various demands Bowers made to prison officials, such as that
they give him certain property or medication, or that they transfer him to a different facility).
Bowers even admitted his motivation. Id. DW  ³>7@KH WKUHDW WKDW SURPSWHG WKH 0D\ 
extraction²KHSURWHVWHGWKDWLWZDVQRWDUHDOWKUHDWEXWMXVWDQHIIRUWWRJHWWUDQVIHUUHGµ,¶PQRW
VXLFLGDO¶KH VDLGµ,¶PFKLOOLQ¶µFDXVH,ZDQWWRJRWR>DGLIIHUHQWLQVWLWXWLRQ@¶´ TXRWLQJDVWDWHPHQW
made by Bowers)).
18
Id. DW TXRWLQJ%RZHUV¶VSULVRQDGPLVVLRQVFRRUGLQDWRUDQGVXSHUYLVRU-HIIUH\+HLVH 
17

19

John R. FitzGerald, Note, Non-Merit-Based Tests Have No Merit: Restoring District Court
Discretion Under § 1915(E)(1), 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2169, 2169 (2018).
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framework vulnerable to exploitation and therefore flawed. This Article argues
that the flaw will be avoided if judges faithfully apply the current legal
framework for deliberate indifference.
To offer background, this Article begins in Part II by describing prisoner
civil rights cases; Part II then goes on to explain what a prisoner who brings a
claim based on self-inflicted harm must prove in order to prevail in a civil suit
against the State. Next, using the Seventh Circuit as a case study, Part III analyzes
the strongest argument for why a sane prisoner who engages in manipulative selfharm (³MSH´) could prevail against the State: analogizing MSH with hunger
striking. Part III then describes why it is problematic for claimants to prevail in
sane MSH cases. Part IV shows that claimants like Bowers, who engage in MSH,
are not in fact analogous to hunger strikers, which means the evolution of the
doctrine in the Seventh Circuit is misguided. Part IV then demonstrates why
claimants like Bowers should in fact lose on the merits when applying the
deliberate indifference framework. Additionally, Part IV shows how Congress,
or the Supreme Court, could clarify the law to ensure that MSH claimants cannot
exploit the § 198320 loophole described in this Article. Generally, this Article
offers a valuable guide for judges and states¶ attorneys confronted with a prisoner
civil rights claim of deliberate indifference brought by a prisoner who is
attempting to exploit § 1983 by engaging in MSH to manipulate prison staff.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Prisoner Civil Rights Cases
³Prisoners in the United States can sue their jailors.´21 Prisoners, under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, can sue state actors who violate their constitutional rights
while incarcerated.22 The list of state actors includes wardens, guards, nurses,
doctors, and others.23 Prisoners can file civil rights claims, but they face obstacles
that a traditional plaintiff does not confront in a civil lawsuit.
For one thing, a prisoner must prove that the State violated the
Constitution, a much greater challenge than proving a tort. A typical person who
sees a doctor and suffers harm will recover if he can prove that the doctor acted
negligently.24 In contrast, an inmate who sees the prison doctor will not recover
under § 1983 if he can only prove negligence; rather, the prisoner must be able

20
21
22
23

42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2020).
FitzGerald, supra note 19.
§ 1983.
Id.

24

What Is Medical Malpractice?, AM. BD. PRO. LIAB. ATT¶YS, https://www.abpla.org/whatis-malpractice (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
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to show ³deliberate indifference to [a] serious medical need´25²a violation of
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.26
Another unique obstacle faced by prisoners is the doctrine of qualified
immunity.27 A full discussion of the doctrine, which has recently come under
scrutiny in both academia and the courts,28 is not central to the argument of this
Article.29 It suffices to say that qualified immunity protects government actors
and halts a prisoner¶s § 1983 claim when the prison official does not violate
³clearly established law.´30 In other words, when there is uncertainty, the benefit
of the doubt goes to the State rather than the prisoner.
Additionally, prisoners face a series of obstacles enacted by Congress in
the Prison Litigation Reform Act (³PLRA´).31 The PLRA requires prisoners to
pay filing fees, pay court costs, and exhaust all grievance procedures before filing
a claim.32 Moreover, it requires judges to screen prisoner civil rights cases before
allowing them to proceed,33 and allows judges to hold telephonic hearings.34 For
the defendant, the PLRA relinquishes the obligation to respond35 and limits
potential damages.36 These are only some of the obstacles set forth in the PLRA37
that are unique to prisoners.

25

Rivera v. Kettle Moraine Corr. Inst., No. 14-C-6, 2014 WL 2875897, at *1 (E.D. Wis. June
24, 2014).
26
27

U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018).

28

See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870±72 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Zadeh v. Robinson, 902 F.3d 483, 498±500 (5th Cir. 2018) (Willett,
J., concurring dubitante); Symposium, Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: The Future of
Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793 (2018).
29

For a full discussion of the doctrine, see Federal Courts, Practice & Procedure: The Future
of Qualified Immunity, supra note 28.
30

Samuel L. Bray, Foreword: The Future of Qualified Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
   ³7KLVGHIHQVHZKLFKSURWHFWVRIILFHUVIURPOLDELOLW\IRUGDPDJHVXQOHVVWKH\
violate clearly established law, has attracted many crLWLFV´  )RU WKH SXUSRVHV RI TXDOLILHG
LPPXQLW\³FOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHGODZ´LVZKHUH³>W@KHFRQWRXUVRIWKHULJKW>DUH@VXIILFLHQWO\FOHDU
WKDWDUHDVRQDEOHRIILFLDOZRXOGXQGHUVWDQGWKDWZKDWKHLVGRLQJYLRODWHVWKDWULJKW´$QGHUVRQY
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987); see also Alan K. Chen, The Intractability of Qualified
Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1937 (2018) (discussing some of the problems caused by the
³FOHDUO\HVWDEOLVKHG´UHTXLUHPHQW 
31
32
33
34
35
36

42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e (West 2020).
28 U.S.C.A § 1915(a)±(b) (West 2020); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(f)(1); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(g)(1); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174.
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(e); FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2174 (footnotes omitted).

37

For a more complete discussion of the PLRA, see Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116
HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003).
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Finally, because prisoner civil rights cases are civil lawsuits, the prisoner
enjoys no constitutional right to an attorney.38 Yet few prisoners can afford
representation.39 Some prisoners find a pro bono lawyer, either independently or
by asking the court to appoint counsel discretionally based on indigency status.40
The remaining indigent prisoners are left to secure counsel in the same way as
any other plaintiff, by entering a contingency fee agreement.41 Finding a lawyer
willing to enter such an agreement is especially difficult for prisoners. Merit and
substance aside,42 taking on a prisoner as a client may not be attractive to an
attorney²it requires traveling to the prison for every meeting and
accommodating the time-consuming and sometimes invasive visitor protocol.43
What is more, some attorneys have moral apprehensions about representing
prisoners or prejudices about the ³nature of the client,´44 which may lead them
to decline to represent an inmate.45 These and similar conditions make securing
counsel particularly challenging for a prisoner.
The purpose of this Section is to show that prisoner civil rights claims
are not easy to win. To put some numbers to it, between 1988 and 2011, prisoner
civil rights cases were disposed of pretrial in favor of the defendant almost 85%
of the time.46 In comparison, prisoner civil rights claims were decided pretrial in

38
39

FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2169.
Id.

40

Id. (reviewing 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(E)(1), the statue that allows district courts to request
private counsel to represent the plaintiff-prisoner in a prisoner civil rights case and considering
what factors a judge should be able to consider when making that determination).
41
Id. at 2185±86.
42

0HULWKHUHUHIHUVWRWKHVWUHQJWKRIWKHSULVRQHU¶VFODLPVXEVWDQFHKHUHUHIHUVWRZKDWLVDW
stake in the litigation, as the remedy (and if damages, the amount of money) a plaintiff may be
awarded. Id. at 2170.
43
Id. at 2182± ³$SSRLQWHG DWWRUQH\V DUH H[SHFWHG WR DGYDQFH PRQH\ WR FRYHU FRVWV RI
discovery, travel, and other litigation expenses. . . . [S]ince prisons tend to be isolated in rural
locations, lawyers may have to travel far distances without reimbursement. Once they arrive at the
prison, lawyers are at the mercy of the institution with regard to whether, and if so, how promptly,
WKH\FDQPHHWZLWKWKHLUFOLHQW´ LQWHUQDOFLWDWLRQVRPLWWHG see also Chesa Boudin, Trevor Stutz,
& Aaron Littman, Prison Visitation Policies: A Fifty-State Survey, 32 YALE L. & POL¶Y J. 149
(2013); Raven Rakia, “A Living Nightmare”: Women Visiting Loved Ones Jailed at Rikers
Describe a Pattern of Invasive Searches by Guards, INTERCEPT (Jan. 10, 2017, 4:08 AM),
https://theintercept.com/2017/01/10/rikers-island-strip-search-new-york-city-jails-visitors/.
44

FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2183 (quoting Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking Prisoner Civil
Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. UNIV. L.J. 417, 484 (1993).
45

Professional Rule of Responsibility 1.16 addresses declining representation. MODEL RULES
1.16 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1980). Declining to represent an inmate for the reasons
discussed above would not appear to run afoul of Rule 1.16 because it allows an attorney to
³ZLWKGUDZLILWFDQEHDFFRPSOLVKHGZLWKRXWPDWHULDODGYHUVHHIIHFWRQWKHFOLHQW¶VLQWHUHVWV´Id.

OF PRO. CONDUCT r.

46

Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA Enters Adulthood, 5 U.C.
IRVINE L. REV. 153, 165 fig.4 (2015).
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favor of the plaintiff less than 1% of the time.47 Only 13% of prisoner civil rights
cases went to trial, and of those, about 11% were decided in the plaintiff¶s
favor.48 It is important to keep this principle in mind²that these are hard-to-win
cases where the deck is stacked heavily against prisoners²before discussing
prisoner civil rights claims.
B. Eighth Amendment Prisoner Civil Rights Claims
One common prisoner civil rights claim is deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs. A prisoner who engages in self-harm and then files a
lawsuit against prison staff for failing to prevent the harm will rely on a deliberate
indifference theory. Such claims are predicated on the following principle, which
the Supreme Court articulated in Estelle v. Gamble: ³An inmate must rely on
prison authorities to treat his medical needs; if the authorities fail to do so, those
needs will not be met. In the worst cases, such a failure may actually produce
physical µtorture or a lingering death.¶´49 Because the inmate is entirely
dependent on the prison to meet his medical needs, deliberate indifference to
those needs constitutes an ³unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.´50 And
unnecessary and wanton infliction of physical pain is, under the United States
Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.51
A plaintiff must satisfy two prongs to successfully prove deliberate
indifference: that the prison official was (1) deliberately indifferent to (2) a
serious medical need.52 The first prong is subjective and the second is objective.

47

Id.

48

Id.; see also Brian J. Ostrom, Roger A. Hanson & Fred L. Cheesman, Congress, Courts and
Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1525, 1537 fig.2 (2003); Margo Schlanger, Trends in Prisoner Litigation, as the PLRA
Approaches 20, 28 CORR. L. REP., Feb.±Mar. 2017, at 69, 84 fig.3; Rachel Poser, Why It’s Nearly
Impossible for Prisoners To Sue Prisons, NEW YORKER, (May 30, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/why-its-nearly-impossible-for-prisoners-to-sueprisons.
49
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (quoting In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447
(1890)).
50
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103).
51

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
Haley Loutfy, Note, Health Care Behind Bars: Constructing a Uniform Deliberate
Indifference Standard To Prevent the Use of the Eighth Amendment as Broad Prison Reform, 45
LINCOLN L. REV. 77, 80 (2018).
52
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A prisoner¶s claim thus fails if prison officials are unaware that the prisoner is
injured or at risk of injury,53 or when the harm or potential harm is trivial.54
The first prong tests whether the prison official (or officials) possessed
the requisite mens rea.55 The clearest and most recent Supreme Court guidance
on this prong is Farmer v. Brennan.56 There, the Supreme Court rejected an
objective test for the mens rea prong, under which a prisoner would satisfy the
prong if he proved that the risk posed to him ³was known or should have been
known by a reasonable prison official.´57 Instead, the Farmer Court opted for a
subjective test, which is satisfied when prison officials are ³consciously aware
of a serious medical need or substantial risk of harm and disregard that need or
risk.´58
The latter prong tests the objective severity of the medical need. The
Supreme Court has not provided any guidance on how to delineate what harm is
serious enough to come within the purview of the Constitution. It is thus
incumbent on district courts to assess severity and establish manageable
standards.59
Even with the instruction of Farmer, the circuits have split on how to
apply the subjective mens rea test. The circuit courts are also divided on how to
assess what constitutes a serious medical need, which is not surprising given the
absence of Supreme Court guidance on the matter. As a result, the two-pronged
deliberate indifference test is applied differently in the various United States
courts of appeals.

53
For an example of an injury that prison officials would have a difficult time anticipating,
and therefore be unable to establish the requisite subjective intent, consider an inmate whose
appendix bursts without warning. E.g., FitzGerlad, supra note 19 (discussing Rivera v. Kettle
Moraine Corr. Inst., No. 14-C-6, 2014 WL 2875897, *1 (E.D. Wis. June 24, 2014), where an
inmate sued his prison for failing to properly anticipate that his appendix would rupture, to which
DQH[SHUWH[SODLQHGWKDW³DSSHQGLFLWLVLVRIWHQHLWKHUPLVVHGRUPLVGLDJQRVHG´ZKHQH[SODLQLQJ
WKDWWKHPHGLFDOFDUHSURYLGHGZRXOGQ¶WHYHQUHDFKWKHOHYHORIPHGLFDOPDOSUDFWLFHQRWWRPHQWLRQ
a constitutional violation).
54
For an example of a trivial medical need, see Dickson v. Colman, 569 F.2d 1310, 1311 (5th
Cir. 1978), where an inmate complained of shoulder pain from a three-year-old accident, but the
examining doctor concluded that no treatment was necessary.
55
56
57
58

Loutfy, supra note 52, at 81.
511 U.S. 825 (1994).
Loutfy, supra note 52, at 80.
Id. at 81 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844).

59

Id.; Jason L. Stern, Prison (In)Justice: An Examination of the Deliberate Indifference
Standard in 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Jail-Suicide Claims, 10 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 173, 186 (2013).
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1. A Review of the Varying Deliberate Indifference Standards
i.

Deliberate Indifference: The Subjective Element

Deliberate indifference analyses can be divided into two predominate
camps. The first camp follows the ³grossly inadequate care´ standard,60
whereby²as the name suggests²deliberate indifference is established by
showing that care is grossly inadequate, or, more specifically, that the ³need for
treatment is obvious, but medical care is so cursory as to amount to no treatment
at all.´61 That a reasonable doctor could have considered his actions lawful is
persuasive evidence that care is not grossly inadequate.62 Deliberate indifference
may exist under this definition when, inter alia, (1) relief is available and an
inmate needlessly suffers due to dilatory prison staff,63 (2) necessary medical
treatment is delayed for nonmedical reasons,64 (3) prison officials opt for easier
or less efficient courses of treatment,65 or (4) nonmedical prison officials know
that an inmate is in extreme pain but delay access to medical personnel.66
The second camp ascribes to the ³medically unacceptable´ test,67
whereby prison officials are deliberately indifferent when their care is ³so far
afield of accepted professional standards as to raise the inference that it was not
actually based on medical judgment . . . [and] that no minimally competent
professional would have so responded under [the same] circumstances.´68
Deliberate indifference may exist under this standard when, inter alia, (1) harm
to a prisoner becomes worse because of a delay in care,69 (2) prison staff fails to
provide medication or treatment despite professional advice to do so,70 or (3)

60

Loutfy, supra note 52, at 82 (attributing the standard to the First, Third, Sixth, Tenth and
Eleventh Circuits).
61
Id. at 85. The Eleventh Circuit described its standard in Waldrop v. Evans³>&DUHWKDWLV@
so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to
IXQGDPHQWDOIDLUQHVV´)G WK&LU 
62
Loutfy, supra note 52, at 85. TXRWLQJ7HUUDQFHY1RUWKYLOOH5HJ¶O3V\FKLDWULF+RVS
F.3d 834, 843 (6th Cir. 2002)).
63
64

Id. (citing Brown v. Hughes, 894 F.2d 1533 (11th Cir. 1990)).
Id. (citing McElligott v. Foley, 182 F.3d 1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1999)).

65

Id. (citing McElligott, 182 F.3d at 1257).
Id. (citing Rosseter v. Annetts, No. 9:10-CV-1097, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139265, at *47
(N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012)).
67
Id. at 86 (attributing this test to the Seventh and Ninth circuits). The Third Circuit applies
essentially the same test, finding deliberate LQGLIIHUHQFH ZKHQ ³VRPH OHYHO RI FDUH KDG EHHQ
SURYLGHGEXWWKHFDUHZDVQRWEDVHGRQVRXQGPHGLFDOMXGJPHQW´Id. at 87 (citing Scott v. Corr.
Med. Servs., No. 06-5552, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55553, at *14 (D.N.J. July 21, 2008)).
68
Id. at 86 (quoting Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 750 (7th Cir. 2011)).
66

69
70

Id. at 87 (citing Arnett, 658 F.3d at 753).
Id.
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prison officials opt for an easier or less effective treatment without approval from
a specialist.71
ii.

Serious Medical Need: The Objective Element

Like the subjective element, the objective element can be divided into
two divergent camps.72 The first camp, consisting of the First, Third, Sixth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits, defines a serious medical need as one ³(1) that has
been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment; (2) that is so obvious that
a lay person would recognize the necessity for a doctor¶s attention; or (3) for
which the delay of or inadequacy of treatment would result in a substantial risk
of serious harm.´73 This definition is the more rigid of the two camps. Prisoners
have satisfied this test with heart-attack-like chest pain,74 severe and lasting
mental anguish,75 and severe dental issues,76 to name a few.
The Second and Ninth Circuits apply a broader test, under which a
serious medical need is ³a µcondition¶ of urgency, one that may produce death,
degeneration, or extreme pain.´77 Courts consider the following factors when
applying this test: ³(1) the existence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or
patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; (2) the
presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual¶s daily
activities; or (3) the existence of chronic or substantial pain.´78 This test is broad
and ³fairly easy to satisfy.´79
2. Tracing the Expansion of the Deliberate Indifference Doctrine:
From Estelle to Self-Harm
Estelle, the seminal deliberate indifference case, addressed indifference
to an inmate¶s physical harm²specifically, the pain suffered when prison staff
allows an inmate¶s injury or physical illness to go untreated.80 Untreated physical

71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. (citing Arnett, 658 F.3d at 754).
Id. at 82.
Id.
Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 754 (10th Cir. 2005).
Kosilek v. Maloney, 221 F. Supp. 2d 156, 180 (D. Mass. 2002).
Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d 1235, 1243±44 (11th Cir. 2003).

77

Loutfy, supra note 52, at 83 (citing Rosseter v. Annetts, No. 9:10-CV-1097, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 139265, at *28 (N.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012)).
78

Id. at 83 (citing Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014); Chance v.
Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)).
79

Loutfy, supra note 52, at 84.
See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (involving an inmate who injured his back when
D FRWWRQ EDOH IHOO RQ KLP WKH SULVRQ GLG QRW WUHDW KLV LQMXU\ GHVSLWH WKH LQPDWH¶V FRQWLQXHG
complaints of back pain).
80
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pain is the most obvious and basic basis for a deliberate indifference claim. Over
time, the principles from Estelle have been applied beyond physical pain.
Namely, courts have expanded deliberate indifference principles to apply to
mental health.81 For instance, the State may be held accountable if an inmate dies
by suicide and the prison failed to train its staff on how to care for suicidal
inmates.82 The doctrine has also been applied to nonmedical cases; for instance,
cases where prison staff fails to protect inmates from hurting one another.83 One
core principle drives each incremental expansions of the doctrine: Because of his
being incarcerated, the prisoner cannot protect himself from harm, and thus
depends on the State to protect him. If the prison fails to protect him, he will go
unprotected.84
Given the expansion of the doctrine and its driving principle, some
inmates who engage in self-harm may have a deliberate indifference claim
against the State. Here is the quintessential example:
Prisoner A is a diagnosed schizophrenic. He is arrested, and the prison
staff knows he is schizophrenic. Furthermore, the prison staff knows A is likely
to engage in self-harm as a symptom of his schizophrenia if he is not properly
treated. Instead of providing A with the proper medication and professional
treatment, the prison staff keeps A in solitary confinement. While there, A harms
himself.85

81

See, e.g., Partridge v. Two Unknown Police Officers, 791 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1986)
(applying the analysis from Estelle to a detainee suicide case); see also Taylor v. Wausau
Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (noting this expansion of the
doctrine form physical needs to mental health needs).
82

See Partridge, 791 F.2d 1182.
Taylor)6XSSGDW ³7KHSULQFLSOHKDVDOVREHHQDSSOLHGRXWVLGHWKHPHGLFDO
context to require prison guards and jailers to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from physical
DVVDXOWVE\NQRZQYLROHQWLQPDWHV´ FLWLQJFarmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994)).
83

84

Id.
7KLVK\SRWKHWLFDOH[DPSOHLVEDVHGRQWKHIDFWVRIUHDOSULVRQHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVWKDWKDYHOHG
to lawsuits. See, e.g., Jeff Coen & Stacy St. Clair, How Solitary Confinement Drove a Young
Illinois Prison Inmate to the Brink of Insanity, HERALD & REV. (Jan. 7, 2019), https://heraldreview.com/news/state-and-regional/crime-and-courts/how-solitary-confinement-drove-a-youngillinois-prison-inmate-to/article_09cca483-419a-57b5-aff1-b1b351d8e195.html
(describing
$QWKRQ\ *D\¶V H[SHULHQFH LQ DQ ,OOLQRLVSULVRn, where he was kept in solitary confinement for
twenty-two years causing his mental health to decline and causing him to frequently engage in selfmutilation); Sam T. Levin, US Prisoner Gouged Out Eyes After Jail Denied Mental Health Care,
Lawsuit
Says,
GUARDIAN
(Dec.
8,
2017),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2017/dec/08/prisoner-gouges-out-eyes-colorado-boulder-mental-health-lawsuit (describing
5\DQ3DUWULGJH¶VH[SHULHQFHLQD&RORUDGRSULVRQZKHUHSULVRQJXDUGVWDVHGEHDWDQGSXQLVKHG
him instead of treating his schizophrenia, leading him to self-mutilation). For a case demonstrating
the straightforward successful claim, see Steele v. Shah, 87 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 1996). In that
case, the prisoner was prescribed psychotropic medication at a prior prison. Id. He was then
transferred to the defendant institution. Id. Upon transfer, the prisoner saw a doctor who met with
him for less than a minute and decided to discontinue the medication. Id. The doctor made the
decision without reviewing any of the pODLQWLII¶V UHFRUGV Id. After hearing the decision, the
85
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A trickier case, or at least what this Article argues should be a trickier
case, is one where the prisoner engages in self-harm for reasons other than mental
illness or a loss of his faculties, which is what this Article means by the term
³sane.´ Recall David Bowers, for instance. Bowers, so it seems, does not engage
in self-harm or threaten to commit suicide because he suffers from an untreated
mental illness. He does not seem to lack control of his faculties; rather, Bowers
uses self-harm to manipulate prison staff and get what he wants, such as a transfer
to a different institution.86
Finally, how we approach prisoner civil±rights cases, it bears noting, has
significant practical importance. It is difficult to find accurate statistics, but this
much is clear: prisoner civil±rights claims²and deliberate indifference claims
specifically²comprise a large portion the federal docket.87 Innumerable
prisoners are directly impacted on a personal level by how we define and
understand deliberate indifference for purposes of the Eighth Amendment
because, as plaintiffs bringing these claims, it dictates what they must prove and
whether they can succeed. At the same time, because the law imposes such
liability, how we define deliberate indifference directly affects prisons and states
on an institutional level. Prisons must establish and inculcate procedures for
preventing deliberate indifference, which imposes tremendous costs on the
State.88 Also costly to the states are litigation fees²fees spent defending guards
and health-care staff in federal court²when prisoners bring such a claim.89 In
other words, how we define deliberate indifference dictates how prisons operate,
and thus indirectly impacts the prison population as a whole.

SULVRQHU¶V IRUPHU LQVWLWXWLRQ ZURWH WR WKH QHZ SULVRQ ZDUQLQJ WKH QHZ SULVRQ RIILFLDOV WKDW WKH
prisoner was at risk for suicide if he continued to go unmedicated. Id. Nevertheless, the prisoner
went on without medication and the prisoner suffered insomnia, anxiety, and bodily pains. Id. at
1267±68. Had the prisoner committed suicide, the case would make an even more straightforward
and apropos example.
86
87

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See FitzGerald, supra note 19, at 2169.

88

7RLOOXVWUDWHVRPHRIWKHSULVRQV¶RSWLRQVDQGZK\WKH\DUHFRVWO\FRQVLGHUWKHIROORZLQJ
When the prison has reason to believe an inmate may hurt himself, it typically requires a whole
team of guards to suit up in protective gear, enter a cell, remove an inmate, and search him for
items he could hurt himself with. Cf. ROBERT D. HANSER, INTRODUCTION TO CORRECTIONS 78 (3d
ed. 2020). In some instances, when an inmate is on suicide watch, prisons require constant
observation by a guard. Cf. Williams v. Eckstein, No. 18-C-1426, 2019 WL 4261105 (E.D. Wis.
Sept. 9, 2019). And in some instances, prisons must put inmates in restraint chairs to prevent selfharm, which may cause the inmate to sue on the theory that the restraint chair constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment. See, e.g., Brown v. Washington Dept. of Corr., No. C13-5367 RBL-JRC 2015
WL 4039322 (W.D. Wash. May 13, 2015).
89

The cost is especially high when the court recruits counsel for the inmate. See generally
FitzGerald, supra note 19.
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III. DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE TO MANIPULATIVE SELF-HARM IN THE
SEVENTH CIRCUIT
As a preliminary matter, it is important to distinguish two different
harms that an inmate like Bowers may face and seek treatment for while
incarcerated. First, the physical harm that occurs once self-harm is inflicted, such
as the gash in his flesh once he cuts himself or the foreign object in his body once
he inserts it. This kind of harm is not contemplated by this Article and is
uncontroversial. Prison authorities undeniably have a constitutional obligation to
treat these injuries, self-imposed or not.90 Second, the kind of harm contemplated
here is the threat of harm that a prisoner who is predisposed to self-harm faces.
Does the prison have an obligation to intervene and prevent such harm once it
has notice that the prisoner plans to inflict it? That is the question considered
here. In other words, the question is not whether the prison must stitch the selfinflicted gash, but whether it must prevent the prisoner from self-inflicting the
gash in the first place; or perhaps more to the point, whether the State is liable
when prison staff fails to prevent the self-inflicted harm.91
The question remains unanswered by the Supreme Court. To narrow the
focus here, this Article considers only how the Seventh Circuit has approached
state liability in cases where the State has failed to prevent a sane prisoner from
self-harm, using the Seventh Circuit as a case study. To that end, this Part begins
by discussing Freeman v. Berge,92 where the Seventh Circuit ruled that prisons
must intervene on non-mentally ill hunger strikers. Dicta in Freeman, which will
be discussed below, suggested that prisons have a duty to intervene on sane,
manipulative self-harm. This Part then traces how the Freeman Court¶s dicta
later became law in Miranda v. City of Lake,93 where the Seventh Circuit
seemingly held that prisons will be liable if they fail to prevent competent
inmates form harming themselves. Last, this Part calls into question the legal
underpinnings and the policy implications of Freeman and Miranda.
According to the Code of Federal Regulations, U.S. prison officials may
force feed a hunger-striking inmate once a physician determines that the inmate¶s
life or health is at risk.94 In Freeman v. Berge, Judge Posner of the Seventh
90

See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104±05 (1976) (holding that
GHOLEHUDWHLQGLIIHUHQFHWRDSULVRQHU¶VVHULRXVPHGLFDOQHHGVYLRODWHVWKH(LJKWK$PHQGPHQW 
91

It also bears noting at the outset that the alternative to imposing liability on guards, medical
staff, and the State, is not to allow guards to do nothing in the face of prisoners engaging in MSH.
State prisons can impose a duty on staff to prevent such conduct. That way, those responsible and
able to prevent the harm will be compelled to act, however the inmate or his estate will not have a
claim for money damages. See Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 889±
90 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
92
93

441 F.3d 543 (7th Cir. 2006).
900 F.3d 335, 349 (7th Cir. 2018).

94

See Sara Cloon, Competent Hunger Strikers: Applying the Lessons from Northern Ireland
to the Force-Feeding in Guantanamo, 31 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL¶Y 383, 389±90
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Circuit pointed out that force feeding arises in two distinguishable
circumstances. In the first circumstance, a mentally ill prisoner is force fed when
his mental illness causes him to refuse food.95 In this circumstance, the prison is
constitutionally required to treat the inmate¶s mental illness by force feeding if
necessary.96 After all, we assume (or at least hope) that an unincarcerated citizen
suffering from the same mental illness would find similar treatment. Because of
the inmate¶s incarceration, he cannot seek treatment himself, and the prison staff
must step in and provide it.
The second circumstance in which force feeding arises is when a
prisoner chooses to refuse food in order to produce a certain outcome or simply
make a political statement.97 And there are logical reasons he might do so; hunger
striking is a traditional method prisoners use to protest the conditions of their
incarceration.98 This is the circumstance the Seventh Circuit faced in Freeman
when considering whether prisons are constitutionally required to intervene on a
non-mentally ill hunger strike. In Freeman, petitioner Barrell Freeman¶s
maximum security prison required prisoners to eat alone in their cells.99 Inmates
had to stand in the middle of their cells with pants on to receive each meal.100 A
prisoner who failed to follow the rules would be refused food.101 Freeman did
not want to wear pants, so on multiple days during a two-and-a-half year span he
refused to wear pants and, per the institution¶s rule, was not served meals.102 As

  ³7KHSK\VLFLDQPXVWILUVWGHWHUPLQHWKDWWKHLQPDWH¶VOLIHRUKHDOWKLVDWULVk. [The Code of
)HGHUDO 5HJXODWLRQV@ WKHQ HQFRXUDJHV WKH VWDII WR FRQYLQFH WKH LQPDWH WR µYROXQWDULO\ DFFHSW
WUHDWPHQW¶ EXW DIWHU VXFK µUHDVRQDEOH HIIRUWV¶ WKH PHGLFDO VWDII LV MXVWLILHG LQ IRUFH-IHHGLQJ´
(internal citations omitted)).
95
See Freeman, 441 F.3d at 546.
96
See id. (first citing Sanville v. McCaughtry, 266 F.3d 724, 733±34 (7th Cir. 2001); and then
citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001)). The hypothetical inmate
described here is analogous to Prisoner A described above. See supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
97

Freeman, 441 F.3d at 546.
See Rusty Reeves, Anthony C. Tamburello, Jennifer Platt, Drew Tepper & Kerri Edelman,
Characteristics of Inmates Who Initiate Hunger Strikes, 45 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 302,
   ³$KXQJHUVWULNHLVDFRPPRQ . . . event within a correctional institXWLRQ´ 3ULVRQHUV
have very little leverage²hunger strikes, work strikes, and self-mutilation being the primary
options²to produce a desired outcome. Sometimes these methods are successful. See Christie
Thompson, Do Prison Strikes Work?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 21, 2016, 2:31 PM),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2016/09/21/do-prison-strikes-work; see also Bowers v.
3ROODUG)6XSSG   ³%RZHUV . . . engaged in [self-harm] at [his previous
institution] in order to get to [a new institution] (which he did) . . . ´ 
98

99
100
101
102

Freeman, 441 F.3d at 544.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a result, Freemen lost significant weight103 and experienced blurred vision.104
Freeman sued the State, arguing that refusing to provide him food for failing to
follow feeding protocol constituted cruel and unusual punishment.105
Judge Posner wrote for the three-judge panel, stating in dicta that ³a
prison [cannot] allow a prisoner to starve himself to death, or even starve himself
to the point at which he seriously impairs his health.´106 Although non-mentally
ill people have a liberty interest in refusing life-saving treatment, Judge Posner
reasoned, prisoners either ³don¶t have such an interest, or it is easily
overridden.´107 The reasons, according to Judge Posner, are practical ones.108
Allowing prisoners to commit suicide would mean allowing them to ³cheat[] the
gallows.´109 It would impede the prison¶s ability to maintain discipline because
inmate suicide agitates the surviving prison population.110 Finally, allowing
starvation could expose prisons to lawsuits and liability.111
The Seventh Circuit ultimately ruled against Freeman for three
reasons.112 First, prison policy required that any prisoner who skipped all meals
for three days in a row be inspected by health personnel.113 Second, Freeman¶s
food deprivation was self-inflicted.114 Third, Freeman did not experience any
³real suffering, extreme discomfort, or any lasting detrimental health
consequences.´115
The ³sane´ prisoner in Judge Posner¶s hypothetical, who refuses food to
produce a desired outcome, is like Bowers. He is engaging in a type of self-harm
not attributable to mental illness but instead attributable to manipulative intent²
MSH. Freeman¶s dicta suggests that deliberate indifference principles have
³evolved into the rule that guards must now protect an inmate from the inmate¶s

103
104
105
106

Id. Freeman lost 45 pounds during his hunger strike. Id.
Id. at 547.
Id.
Id. at 546.

107
Id. (first citing In re Grand Jury Subpoena John Doe, 150 F.3d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1998) (per
curiam); then citing Martinez v. Turner, 977 F.2d 421, 423 (8th Cir. 1992); then citing Laurie v.
Senecal, 666 A.2d 806, 809 (R.I. 1995); then citing In re Caulk, 480 A.2d 93, 96±97 (N.H. 1984);
then citing State ex rel. White v. Narick, 292 S.E.2d 54, 58 (W. Va. 1982); then citing McNabb v.
'HS¶WRI&RUU3G±95 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); and then citing People ex rel. 'HS¶W
of Corr. v. Fort, 815 N.E.2d 1246, 1250±51 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004)).
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

Id. at 547.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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own efforts to injure himself, even in the absence of evidence of a severe mental
illness that has robbed the inmate of his faculties.´116 Indeed, if a non±mentally
ill prisoner must be force fed in order to curtail the harm of a hunger strike, how
can a court justify nonintervention to other forms of MSH (e.g., Bowers) where
prisoners self-mutilate and threaten suicide as a manipulation tactic? The
approach to hunger strikes described in Freeman buttresses an argument that
prisons that fail to stop self-harm (regardless of its cause) must be held
accountable for deliberate indifference.
But Posner leaves a major issue in Freeman unaddressed. When prison
officials are deliberately indifferent to a physical illness, mental illness, or threat
from a fellow inmate, ³the rationale underlying such claims would seem to
require a threat to the inmate¶s safety from which, as a result of his incarceration,
he is unable to protect himself.´117 A claimant like Bowers, or a sane hunger
striker, whose self-harm is not attributable to ³mental illness or some other
condition that deprived [him] of his rational faculties,´118 marks a departure from
the doctrine¶s underlying rationale. A prisoner engaging in self-harm for a
calculated purpose makes a deliberate decision²he is able to protect himself; he
merely chooses not to.
Twelve years after Freeman, in Miranda v. City of Lake,119 the Seventh
Circuit made explicit what Posner had suggested in Freeman. Lake County Jail
inmate Lyvita Gomes was placed on suicide watch and hunger strike protocol
because she was refusing food, water, and all medical treatment.120 In the course
of ten days, Gomes¶s weight dropped from 146 pounds to 128 pounds,121 which
prompted a psychiatric examination by Dr. Hargurmukh Singh.122 Dr. Singh
diagnosed Gomes with ³psychotic disorder not otherwise specified,´ but
prescribed no medication.123 Dr. Singh concluded that Gomes¶s mental health
condition ³rendered her unable to understand the risks of not eating and unable
to participate in her treatment plan.´124 Gomes¶s condition only worsened.125
Ultimately, Lake County Jail medical staff sent Gomes to a hospital 15 days after
she arrived at the jail, and she died 5 days after that.126

116

Goodvine v. VandeWalle, No. 16-C-890, 2018 WL 460121, at *8 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2018).

117

Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
Id.

118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126

900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018).
Id. at 342.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 342.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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Gomes¶s Estate filed several claims, naming several defendants,
including Lake County Jail medical staff members.127 Only the claims against
the medical staff members went to trial.128 At trial, Gomes¶s family members
testified that Gomes was a devout Catholic with no history of mental illness and
that she would not have committed suicide.129 Based in large part on that
testimony, the district court decided to ³bar all reference to the theory that the
medical defendants violated the Due Process Clause by failing to protect Gomes
from harming herself.´130 Gomes¶s Estate challenged the decision on appeal,
among other things.
In its brief on appeal, the defendants urged the Seventh Circuit to affirm
the district court¶s decision to reject the failure-to-protect theory, arguing in part
that prison medical staff cannot be liable for failing to prevent a competent
inmate from committing self-harm.131 The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument,
holding that the district court would have to allow the plaintiff to pursue a failureto-protect theory at the retrial.132 The Seventh Circuit reasoned as follows: While
competent persons have a due-process right to refuse lifesaving hydration and
nutrition, the right does not extend to incarcerated persons.133 Citing Freeman,
the Seventh Circuit implicitly held that all inmates are incompetent, and that,
jails therefore have a duty to prevent all prisoners from giving way to the unusual
psychological strain caused by incarceration.134
The Miranda Court did not squarely address the departure from the
underlying deliberate indifference policy²i.e., that a sane prisoner engaging in
self-harm is able to protect himself and merely chooses not to. But the Miranda
Court addressed this departure by making the sweeping declaration that all
inmates are incompetent. To use the parlance of this Article, the Miranda Court
declared, in essence, that there is no such thing as a sane prisoner.
But it cannot be true that there is no such thing as a sane prisoner. Yes,
incarceration doubtless imposes mental strain on inmates, but that strain leads to
behavior of many stripes²violence against guards or other inmates, stealing,
smuggling prohibited items and substances into prison, etc.²and inmates are
held responsible for such behavior. As they should be. After all, while many
inmates have been diagnosed with a mental illness of one kind or another,
prisoners are ultimately serving sentences for crimes because they have been

127

Id.

128

Id.
Id. at 349.

129
130

Id. at 348±49.
Brief of Defendants±Appellees at 17, Miranda v. City of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018)
(No. 17-1603), 2017 WL 4572369, at *17.
132
Miranda, 900 F.3d at 349.
131

133
134

Id.
Id. (citing Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2006)).
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found criminally responsible for their behavior. Any prisoner who develops a
severe mental illness after commencing a sentence should be transferred to such
a mental health facility.
On a similar note, one could make the converse argument, that ³no
suicide is truly intentional[] because it is not an excercise of free will.´135 Put
differently, instead of taking the approach of the Miranda Court and arguing that
there is no sane prisoner, one could argue that there is no sane suicide. While that
proposition may or may not be empirically true, just as it may or may not be
empirically true that all prisoners are incompetent due to mental strain, U.S. law
currently disavows this understanding of human behavior.136 ³The law assumes
that, absent serious mental illness or other form of incapacity, a person has free
will and is therefore responsible for his own intentional acts.´137 This
understanding of human behavior is deeply rooted in U.S. law.138
A prisoner who is not suffering from a mental illness or any other
condition robbing him of his faculties faces no threat of self-harm from which he
cannot protect himself. Moreover, he faces no threat of self-harm from which he
would protect himself but for his incarceration and from which he relies on prison
officials, as a nature of his incarceration, to provide protection. In other words,
MSH does not logically fit within the deliberate indifference doctrine. The core
principle driving the doctrine does not apply. To sweepingly decide instead that
all prisoners, or all suicides, must as a matter of law be the result of incompetence
would be to depart from that core principle.
Including MSH in the doctrine is not just illogical, it is also unwise.
Policy considerations urge against allowing the manipulative self-harming
prisoner to recover under § 1983. It would allow prisoners to engineer a
constitutional claim, creating perverse incentives for prisoners to self-harm or
threaten suicide.139 If the idea of the deliberate indifference doctrine²or the

135
Joseph v. State, 26 P.3d 459, 471 (Alaska 2001); see also LINDSAY M. HAYES, NATIONAL
INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, PRISON SUICIDE: AN OVERVIEW AND GUIDE TO PREVENTION 6 (1995)
³>$@Q\LQPDWHZKRZRXOGJRWRWKHH[WUHPHRIWKUHDWHQLQJVXLFLGHRUHQJDJLQJLQVHOI-injurious
EHKDYLRULVVXIIHULQJIURPDWOHDVWDQHPRWLRQDOLPEDODQFHWKDWUHTXLUHVVSHFLDODWWHQWLRQ´ $OOHQ
C. Schlinsog, Jr., The Suicidal Decedent: Culpable Wrongdoer, or Wrongfully Deceased, 24 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 463, 477±79 (1991).
136
137

Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
Id.

138
See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250±51 (1952) (noting that the U.S.
OHJDOV\VWHPDVVXPHVWKH³EHOLHILQIUHHGRPRIWKHKXPDQZLOODQGDFRQVHTXHQWDELOLW\DQGGXW\
RIWKHQRUPDOLQGLYLGXDOWRFKRRVHEHWZHHQJRRGDQGHYLO´ see also Taylor, 423 F. Supp. 2d at
888 n.5 (explaining contradiction between the theory that no self-harm or suicide can be the product
of free will and the position advanced by anyone who advocates for legal physician assisted
suicide).
139

Taylor)6XSSGDW ³7RKROG>WKDWDPDQLSXODWLYHVHOI-harming prisoner can
recover under the Eight Amendment] would . . VHHPWREHSHUPLWWLQJDSULVRQHUµWRHQJLQHHUDQ
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Eighth Amendment generally²is to keep prisoners safe and healthy, then MSH
necessarily ought not be legally incentivized.
Two perverse incentives are created by allowing inmates engaging in
MSH to recover: negotiating power and money. If a prisoner can succeed on a
claim of self-harm without showing that he was robbed of his faculties and could
not prevent the harm himself, then prisoners are left with a macabre cost-benefit
analysis: Is the self-imposed pain worth a possible increase in negotiating power?
Better yet (for the prisoner) is threatening suicide²which involves no physical
pain²worth a possible increase in negotiating power? If it is, and there are many
reasons why it might be,140 then the prisoner will go forth with the threat of actual
self-harm²there is a chance prison staff will intervene and acquiesce to the
prisoner¶s demand in order to avoid a constitutional claim.
Another perverse incentive is the potential financial award. Money has
great value in prison, as in all parts of society, and prisoners lack many ways to
acquire it.141 A prisoner who wants money, whether to use in prison or send to
someone outside of the prison, and who is not satisfied with the paltry wages
available within the institution, may have no option but to lodge a prisoner-civil
rights lawsuit. Unless that prisoner¶s constitutional rights are already being
violated, he would have to find a way to ³engineer´ a claim. As courts have
recognized, it is bad policy to allow a prisoner the ability to engineer a

Eight Amendment violation . . . ¶´  TXRWLQJ 5RGULJXH] Y %ULOH\  )G   WK &LU
2005)).
140
Consider, for example, a prisoner with a high tolerance for pain who wants to be transferred
to a different institution to be closer to his family and friends. A brief period of physical pain
would²if his negotiation is successful²DOORZKLPWRJHWVRPHWKLQJKHFRXOGQ¶WRWKHUZLVHJHWE\
a standard request. If he knows it might work and is willing to withstand the pain, why not give it
a try?
141

Telephone Interview with Robert Holleman, Wabash Valley Correctional Facility inmate,
(Oct. 12, 2018) (describing his multiple successful § 1983 claims against Wabash Valley
Correctional Facility, and explaining that the money, dollar-for-dollar, has more value in prison
than out of prison, and explaining that he has no shortage of things he can use his money for,
including sharing it with unincarcerated loved ones). To read about HROOHPDQ¶VVXFFHVVHVDJDLQVW
correction facilities, see, for example, Rebecca R. Bibbs, More than 30 Pendleton Inmates,
Families Sue Corizon Health over Death, Injuries, IND. ECON. DIG. (Oct. 11, 2015),
https://indianaeconomicdigest.com/main.asp?SectionID=31&SubSectionID=64&ArticleID=8148
2; Stuart Hirsch, DOC Inmate Wins Settlement; Federal Judge Rebukes Officials, HERALD BULL.
(Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.heraldbulletin.com/news/local_news/doc-inmate-wins-settlementfederal-judge-rebukes-officials/article_20caa376-b2d7-11e7-a92a-c32da61758b2.html; Marilyn
Odendahl,
Same
Court,
New
Experience,
IND. LAW.
(Aug.
28,
2012),
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/29541-same-court-new-experience; Ruling for Doctor
Reversed in Inmate’s Gluten-Free Diet Suit, IND. LAW. (May 17, 2017),
https://www.theindianalawyer.com/articles/43742-ruling-for-doctor-reversed-in-inmates-glutenfree-diet-suit. According to Holleman, money has higher value because inmates can only work a
limited number of jobs, paying two dollars per day at most. Aside from that, gifts and lawsuits are
the only two ways to make money. Id.
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constitutional claim against his jailor.142 (If he can, then that fact marks a
loophole in the law well worth fixing.)
This Section has demonstrated two things. First, precedent suggests that
a court confronted with the issue and the appropriate facts may rule in favor of
an inmate in an MSH case. Second, such a holding would be problematic because
it would mark an unjustifiable diversion from the core principle underlying the
deliberate indifference doctrine: that ³the prisoner, by virtue of his incarceration,
is deprived of his normal opportunities for protecting himself.´143 The holding
would also create perverse incentives: it would give prisoners the ability to
engineer Eighth Amendment claims by self-harming or threatening to self-harm,
which would give manipulative, self-harming prisoners negotiating power.
Prisoners could force prison officials to decide between acquiescing to inmate
demands or facing § 1983 litigation. It could also cause prisoners to self-harm
for a chance at a big financial award.144
IV. HOW TO FIX OR AVOID THE DELIBERATE INDIFFERENCE LOOPHOLE
This Part proposes a solution on how to fix or avoid the deliberate
indifference loophole in three Sections. Section IV.A distinguishes MSH from
the sane hunger striker described in Freeman and Miranda to show that the
precedential weight of the two cases should be limited to cases of hunger
striking.145 Section IV.B considers how to properly analyze MSH under the two-

142

See, e.g., Rodriguez, 403 F.3d at 953; Taylor, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 889 (citing Rodriguez, 403
F.3d at 953). The Rodriguez court explained:
Rodriguez punished himself . . . 6XSSRVHKH¶GDQQRXQFHGWKDWKHZRXOGVNLS
dinner every day unless he were served champagne and caviar at least once a
month. He, not the prison, would be the author of his being denied dinner. A
prisoner cannot force the prison to change its rules by going on a hunger strike
and blaming the prison for his resulting loss of weight. He cannot, in short, be
permitted to engineer an Eight Amendment Violation. The analogy is to civil
contempt. A person who is imprisoned for refusing to sign a deed that he is
legally obligated to sign, but who can get out of prison just by signing it, cannot
complain that he is being punished.
Rodriguez, 403 F.3d at 953 (internal citations omitted). For an example of a prisoner who, arguably,
used self-harm to engineer a constitutional claim against his jailor, see Bowers v. Pollard, 602 F.
Supp. 2d 977 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
143

Taylor, 423 F. Supp. 2d at 887.
See, for example, Hirsch, supra note 141 for an indication of the damages at stake in prisoner
civil rights cases.
145
Of course, by its facts, Miranda is not a case of a sane hunger striker. Gomes was engaging
in self-harm because of a diagnosed mental illness. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this Article,
Miranda is treated as a sane-hunger-VWULNLQJ FDVH EHFDXVH RI WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V DUJXPHQW 7KH
defendant argued that the evidence showed that Gomes was not mentally ill. The Court rejected
the argument, not just by deciding that the record included significant evidence to the contrary, but
DOVRE\GHFLGLQJWKDWWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VDUJXPHQWZRXOGIDLOeven if Gomes were not mentally ill. See
Miranda v. City of Lake, 900 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2018).
144
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prong deliberate indifference analysis and concludes that such plaintiffs should
typically fail under one or both prongs. Section IV.C explains how Congress, or
the Supreme Court, could clarify the law in a way that eliminates the MSH issue
altogether.
A. Considering the Precedent: Distinguishing Starvation and SelfMutilation
Under Miranda, the state is obligated to prevent harm even when the
prisoner could protect himself from it²a departure from the core deliberate
indifference principle that a prisoner must not be able to defend himself against
the harm posed in order to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. MSH is,
however, sufficiently distinguishable from sane hunger striking that courts
should not rely on Miranda to further extend the departure from this core
principle. In other words, there is a difference between MSH and hunger striking,
and, by sweepingly declaring that the state is liable in all cases of MSH regardless
of mental health, the Seventh Circuit acted imprudently.
The hunger striking in Freeman and Miranda, which is sane self-harm
via starvation, is distinguishable from the sorts of self-harm contemplated here,
most commonly self-mutilation or similar self-harm. Starvation is a unique kind
of self-harm. It¶s gradual, noticeable, and easily interrupted.146 Once a prisoner
stops eating, the state can easily notice it, monitor the inmate¶s health, and when
it becomes apparent that the prisoner is in a serious risk of medical harm, the
prison can rest assured that its intervention techniques will likely (although not
always)147 be effective and constitutional.148 In contrast, self-mutilation or
suicide (threatened or real) is typically acute and difficult to prevent without
either accepting an inmate¶s demands, placing the inmate in a solitary cell,149 or
restraining the inmate to make him immobile and unable to harm himself.150
Unlike starvation, the state cannot confidently know what will prevent MSH²

146

It takes a person 21 to 70 days to die of starvation, and there are many developed ways to
force feed prisoners who refuse food. See Catie Edmondson, Prison Inmates on Hunger Strike
J.
SENTINEL
(June
24,
2016),
Being
Force-Fed,
MILWAUKEE
https://www.jsonline.com/story/news/politics/2016/06/24/prison-inmates-on-hunger-strike-beingforcefed/86372116/ (describing some methods of force feeding); Thomas C. Weiss, What Happens
When We Starve? Phases of Starvation, DISABLED WORLD (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.disabledworld.com/fitness/starving.php (regarding how long a person can survive without food).
147
148

See, e.g., Miranda, 900 F.3d at 349.
See Cloon, supra note 94.

149

Sometimes this technique works and prevents self-harm. SUICIDE PREVENTION RES. CTR.,
WHAT CORRECTIONS PROFESSIONALS CAN DO TO PREVENT SUICIDE (2007). Sometimes, however, it
exacerbates the problem. Id. It is impossible to know which will be the case, making this method
less than ideal. Id.
150

This technique can lead to its own § 1983 claims, making this course of action also less than
ideal. See Johnson v. McVea, No. 15-1586, 2016 WL 1223067 (E.D. La. Mar. 7, 2016).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2020

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 123, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 8

604

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 123

in fact, the state cannot even know whether the inmate will engage in MSH until
the inmate actually does. And to add to the complexity, any reaction by the state
could induce further MSH.151 So, while the sane hunger striker is conceptually
similar to the sane manipulative self-harmer, the state¶s menu of reactive options
is quite different, and the state¶s calculus when deciding whether to intervene
and how is exceptionally more complex.
Not only is the harm notably different, the reasons for overriding the
prisoner¶s right to starve himself do not equally apply to MSH. Whereas Posner
is right that a prisoner allowed to starve himself to death is able to cheat the
gallows²at least insofar as opting for death over prison ends incarceration²the
same logic does not justify holding the state liable for failing to prevent MSH.
Only death, not injury, ends one¶s punishment. It is true that the state¶s nonaction
may, in some instances, lead to an inmate committing suicide if the state
miscalculates about the necessary response to the threatened harm.152 Unlike a
starving inmate, though, the prison officials need to make challenging decisions
about whether an inmate is in fact likely to engage in MSH; how serious the
potential MSH might be; how soon it will be inflicted, if at all; and whether
responding to the threat of self-harm will benefit the prisoner¶s well-being, or
induce more frequent and severe harm in the future. Allowing prison officials
and medical professionals some latitude in making these calculations, rather than
forcing them to err on the side of acquiescence to inmate demands (even if it is
a course of action that will produce further and more widespread self-harm in the
future), does not mean prisoners are permitted to cheat the gallows. Quite the
opposite, a system that promotes self-harm as an effective negotiating strategy
allows prisoners to game the penal system by giving inmates control over the
conditions of their punishment.
The second reason Posner gave for overriding prisoners¶ right to suicide,
that permitting suicide impedes the prison¶s ability to maintain discipline, is
turned on its head in the MSH context. Sure, allowing prisoners to starve
themselves to death will agitate the inmate population and complicate the
operation of the institution. But allowing prisoners to use MSH as a negotiation
tactic impedes the prison¶s ability to maintain discipline in an even more direct
and significant way. If prisoner A cuts himself one day and threatens to do it
again the next unless he is transferred to a different institution, and to prevent
further harm the state transfers A, it stands to reason that every prisoner who
wants a transfer enough to withstand the pain is going to cut himself. And then
what? Should they all be transferred? What if the demands are more outlandish:
choosing cellmates, getting a cellphone, picking the lunch menu? As described

151
See, e.g., Goodvine v. VandeWalle, No. 16-C-890, 2018 WL 460121, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Jan.
17, 2018).
152
Of course, the StatHZRXOGZRUNWRSUHYHQWSULVRQHUVXLFLGH7KHDUJXPHQWKHUHLVQRW³/HW
WKHLQPDWHVFRPPLWVXLFLGHMXVWGRQ¶WJLYHWKHPZKDWWKH\GHPDQG´7KHDUJXPHQWLV³6RPHWLPHV
no action might be the appropriate reaction to self-harm or threatened self-KDUP´
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above, the prison can take courses of action other than acquiescence,153 but none
are ideal, and nonaction may justifiably be the safest and most optimal route.
Eliminating nonaction from the state¶s menu of reactive options is what will most
impede the prison¶s ability to maintain discipline.
The third and final reason Posner gave is that allowing inmate suicide
would expose prisons to lawsuits brought by decedent prisoners¶ estates.154
Posner is right, but the reasoning is uncompelling because it is irrelevant, a red
herring. Whether or not recognizing a right will produce litigation does not
address the real issue: the existence of the right in the first place. Overriding a
right because its existence would expose violators of that right to lawsuits
follows the same logic as decriminalizing murder because it exposes murderers
to criminal punishment²of course it would, all crimes expose offenders to
criminal punishment, that is the point. All rights expose others to potential
lawsuits because a legal right is a prerequisite for a case.155 What is more: If a
right can be justifiably overridden because it will produce lawsuits, what does
that mean for rights writ large?
The two propositions²that sane hunger strike and MSH are distinct
types of self-harm, and that the reasons to override a prisoner¶s right to engage
in the former do not apply to the latter²taken together, show that the dicta in
Freeman should have little if any bearing on the issue of MSH. Therefore, even
if sane hunger strikes constitute a permissible departure from the core deliberate
indifference principle (that the prisoner faces a harm from which he cannot
protect himself), MSH does not.
B. Applying the Deliberate Indifference Test to MSH
It may seem intuitively wrong that an inmate engaging in MSH could
recover under § 1983. It should because, as mentioned above, it marks a
departure from the underlying principle of deliberate indifference. Such a
claimant is not facing a threat to his safety from which, because of his
incarceration, he cannot protect himself.156 But that principle²even though it
drives the doctrine²is not itself a part of the test for deliberate indifference.157
The only two factors are (1) that the prison was deliberately indifferent to (2) a
serious medical need.158
Even though it is not part of the doctrine, the driving principle matters.
The underlying principle drives what the test seeks to determine. If a plaintiff
153
Most notably, the prison can put the inmate in solitary confinement or restrain the inmate²
but both courses of action are not ideal.
154
Freeman v. Berge, 441 F.3d 543, 546±47 (7th Cir. 2006).
155
156
157
158

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 887 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
Loutfy, supra note 52, at 80.
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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satisfies both prongs of the deliberate indifference test, but he is not facing a
threat to his safety from which he cannot, due to his incarceration, protect
himself, then the test is either insufficient or it is being incorrectly applied. This
Article argues that allowing MSH petitioners to prevail constitutes the latter, an
incorrect application of the test.159
1. Applying the Deliberate Indifference (Subjective) Element
Both definitions of deliberate indifference described above²the
grossly-inadequate-care definition and the medically-unacceptable-care
definition²support the conclusion that at least some instances of MSH do not
satisfy the subjective element. The two definitions are discussed in turn.
Prison staff members are not deliberately indifferent under the grosslyinadequate-care standard when the need for care is nonobvious or when the care
provided is not grossly inadequate.160 In a case of MSH, whenever the likelihood
of self-infliction is uncertain, for instance, if prison staff confront a prisoner who
frequently threatens but never inflicts self-harm, the need for care is nonobvious.
In such circumstances it is unknown whether the prisoner needs care. What is
more, whenever a medical professional concludes that no intervention is the best
reaction to a prisoner¶s MSH, and advises prison staff accordingly, it reasonably
follows that nonaction is not grossly inadequate.161 If nonaction is what the
medical professional advises as the best course of action, it is not only adequate,
it is optimal. In comparison, intervention, especially acquiescence to the
prisoner¶s demands, may be grossly inadequate because it may ultimately
encourage self-harm if he or his fellow inmates come to see MSH as an effective
negotiation tactic.
In other jurisdictions, prison staff is deliberately indifferent under the
medically-unacceptable-care standard when care ³raise[s] the inference that it
was not actually based on medical judgment´ such that ³no minimally competent
professional would have so responded under [the same] circumstances.´162 Under
this definition, a prison must be able to show that a health professional evaluated
the inmate and concluded that no intervention was appropriate, and furthermore,
that the conclusion was medically reasonable. Similar to the grossly-inadequatecare standard, the MSH prisoner should not be able to satisfy the deliberate
indifference prong as long as the course of action taken is defensible as a matter

159

$VDSURFHGXUDOPDWWHULIDQLQPDWH¶VVDQLW\ZHUHDWLVVXHLQDFDVHWKHFRXUWZRXOGKROG
an evidentiary hearing. Both plaintiff and defense would likely call expert witnesses²doctors
specializing in psychiatry, psychology, or the like²to testify to comSHWLQJWKHRULHVRQWKHLQPDWH¶V
sanity, and ultimately the factfinder would make the decision.
160

Loutfy, supra note 52, at 85.
This proposition RQO\KROGVWUXHRIFRXUVHLIWKHPHGLFDOSURIHVVLRQDO¶VDGYLFHLVQRWLWVHOI
grossly inadequate.
162
Loutfy, supra note 52, at 86.
161
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of medical judgment.163 Under both tests, it is crucial that the prison staff seek
professional medical advice when deciding how to react to the threat of harm.
When it is not borne out of professional medical judgment, opting for nonaction
will be tough, if not impossible, to defend. But when nonaction is the product of
medical judgment, it should rarely, if ever, give rise to a successful prisoner civil
rights claim.
2. Applying the Serious Injury (Objective) Element
The objective element is easier for a prisoner to satisfy than the
subjective element, but some instances of MSH will not satisfy this element.
Under the more rigid definition of serious injury, the mandated treatment and
obviousness definition,164 serious harm is (1) a diagnosis requiring treatment, (2)
so obvious that a lay person would recognize the need for medical attention, or
(3) a harm so serious that delayed or inadequate treatment would put the prisoner
in a substantial risk of harm.165 The three parts of the definition are discussed in
turn.
As for the first part, a diagnosis requiring treatment, MSH will not
always satisfy the standard because in some cases the risk of self-harm will not
be diagnosed by a physician as a ³condition´ requiring treatment. After all, when
there is no indication that the risk of injury is symptomatic of an untreated mental
illness, what would the ³condition´ be? And what would the treatment be? In
such instances, the physician would likely find no ³condition´ to diagnose, and,
even if she did consider the propensity for self-harm a ³condition,´ she may
determine that nonaction is the best reaction to avoid incentivizing future selfharm, as opposed to any formal ³treatment.´
As for the second part of the definition, that the injury is so obvious a
lay person would recognize the need for medical attention, the proverbial ³lay
person´ in this situation may not consider it obvious that the ³condition´ requires
a doctor¶s attention. If the lay person shares the same understanding of human
behavior as our legal system²³that, absent serious mental illness or other form
of incapacity, a person has free will and is therefore responsible for his own

163
See Davis v. Harding, No. 12-CV-559-wmc, 2014 WL 5454216, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 24,
  ³>'DYLV¶VGRFWRU@NQHZ'DYLVXVHGWKUHDWVRIVHOI-harm to manipulate staff and that he had
not acted on a threat of self-harm in over three years. Under these circumstances, [the doctor]
H[HUFLVHGSURIHVVLRQDOMXGJPHQWLQGHFLGLQJKRZWRSULRULWL]H'DYLV¶VGHPDQGVRQKHUWLPH . . . .
Davis has offered no HYLGHQFHWKDW>WKHGRFWRU¶V@GHFLVLRQWRPDNHDQRWKHUSDWLHQW¶VQHHGVDSULRULW\
was an act of deliberate indifference, rather than one of many ordinary acts of discretion doctors
DUHFDOOHGRQWRH[HUFLVHPXOWLSOHWLPHVDGD\´ 
164
165

Loutfy, supra note 52, at 82.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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intentional acts´166²then he may reason that a doctor¶s attention is unnecessary
to prevent an act of free will.
Finally, regarding the third part of the definition, the delay or inadequacy
of treatment does not result in a substantial risk of serious harm when treatment
is deemed an ineffective course of action. If nonaction is the best reaction, there
is no treatment to delay.167
Even under the broader definition, some instances of MSH may not
satisfy the serious-injury element. The broad definition ³relax[es] the serious
injury element making it fairly easy to satisfy the first prong of the deliberate
indifference test.´168 The argument against liability is weaker under this
definition, but it is still worth making. It will be the rare case that the potential
for self-inflicted harm is not ³worthy of comment.´ In the event that a prisoner
regularly threatens self-harm, however, and never follows through, allowing the
prison system to confidently ³call the inmate¶s bluff,´ the threat of harm may
indeed not be worthy of comment. Indeed, such confidence by the prison staff
may be rare. That being said, because this broad definition of the objective
element dilutes the objective element to the point that it almost serves no
purpose, a court would be justified in setting a higher bar for the subjective
element when applying the not-worthy-of-comment test for the objective
element.
***
Looming in the background of this discussion is the fact that a prisoner
has almost no ability to control his situation and every incentive to sue his jailor.
Doubtless, Congress could dwarf the prevalence of MSH in prisons by
engendering better avenues for inmates to bargain with their jailors and effect
change. For this reason²and innumerable other reasons beyond the purview of
this Article169²Congress should re-implement a sentencing scheme whereunder
prisoners may be eligible for early release on parole for good behavior.
This is not an Article about sentencing, so a deep dive into American
criminal sentencing is inapt, but a few words are in order. The federal criminal
system once abided by a flexible sentencing scheme: ³Indeterminate sentences
were imposed, which meant that the judge´ exercised discretion²at the outset
when imposing the sentence²in deciding when during the course of an
offender¶s sentence he would become eligible for parole.170 Once an inmate

166

Taylor v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 423 F. Supp. 2d 882, 888 (E.D. Wis. 2006).

167

,Q WKH HYHQW WKDW D SODLQWLII FDOOV LQWR TXHVWLRQ WKH PHGLFDO VWDII¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WKDW
nonaction is the best reaction²presumably with expert testimony²a question of fact would arise
for the jury to determine.
168
Loutfy, supra note 52, at 84.
169

See, e.g., Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Clemency, Parole, Good-Time Credits, and Crowded Prisons:
Reconsidering Early Release, 11 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL¶Y 1 (2013).
170

Gerald Bard Tjoflat, The Evolution of the Federal Criminal Sentencing System, 13 AM. U.
INT¶L L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1998).
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became eligible for parole, the Parole Commission exercised discretion to
determine whether to grant parole.171 The system had its basis in a rehabilitation
theory of punishment.172 The idea being that the Parole Commission would
decide whether an inmate was sufficiently rehabilitated to successfully return to
society.173 Starting in the mid-1970s, the criminal justice system gradually
moved away from the flexible sentencing model and toward a determinate
sentencing model.174 Under a determinate sentencing model, an offender¶s
sentence generally cannot be shortened based on an inmate¶s behavior.175 The
determinate sentencing model is essentially what federal prisoners encounter
today.176
A lot has changed since the 1970¶s. For instance, we have more
information: we now know determinate sentencing causes a deluge in prisoner
litigation.177 We also have better technology: for instance, we now have reliable
and affordable GPS tracking devices and drug testing technology.178 It is time to
return to a more flexible sentencing model. Such a model would remove²or at
least relax²many of the perverse incentives alive in the current system that
influence prisoners to bring frequent lawsuits and induce poor behavior, just one
example of which is MSH.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article identifies a loophole in the current deliberate indifference
doctrine that prisoners can and are exploiting.179 Specifically, prisoners can
engineer a § 1983 claim with MSH. The loophole is problematic because it
incentivizes self-harm and, if allowed to persist, gives dangerous negotiating
power to prisoners. Not only is this loophole problematic from a public policy
171

Id.
Jonathan J. Wroblewdki, History and Future of the Sentencing Commission, 13 AM. U. INT¶L
L. REV. 1072, 1073 (1998).
173
Tjoflat, supra note 170, at 1079.
172

174

See id. at 1079±80.
Under the current federal sentencing scheme, an inmate can only earn a maximum of 54
days off of his sentence per year for good behavior. In other words, regardless of behavior, an
inmate must serve 85% of his sentence. Glossary of Federal Sentencing-Related Terms, U.S.
SENTENCING COMM¶N, https://www.ussc.gov/education/glossary (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
176
Id.; Michael Santos, How To Understand Sentencing Systems, PRISON PROFESSORS (Aug.
26, 2017), https://prisonprofessors.com/how-to-understand-sentencing-systems. In contrast to the
federal criminal system, several states follow the indeterminate sentencing model. BUREAU OF
JUST. ASSISTANCE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF STRUCTURED SENTENCING.
177
See Schlanger, supra note 37, at 1584 Fig. I.A.
175

178

See, e.g., Avlana K. Eisenberg, Mass Monitoring, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 123 (2017) (discussing
GPS tracking); David Evans, 1 Drug Testing Law Tech. & Prac. §5:1 (2020 West) (discussing drug
testing).
179
E.g., Goodvine v. VandeWalle, No. 16-C-890, 2018 WL 460121 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 17, 2018).
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standpoint, it also represents an untenable departure from the deliberate
indifference doctrine. The principle underlying the doctrine²that ³the prisoner,
by virtue of his incarceration, is deprived of his normal opportunities for
protecting himself´180²does not apply to MSH.
In reaction to the problematic and doctrinally precarious loophole, this
Article makes multiple suggestions that, if followed, will alleviate the possible
consequences. On the conservative end, this Article shows how courts should
treat MSH cases under the current deliberate indifference frameworks. MSH
claims should at least fail one of the two deliberate indifference prongs and may
fail both. Attorneys representing the state, as well as courts hearing these cases,
should draw from the reasoning here to avoid exacerbating a jurisprudential
loophole and overstretching the deliberate indifference doctrine.
On the more quixotic end, this Article shows that Congress or the
Supreme Court could clarify the deliberate indifference framework. Specifically,
the framework would require that the prisoner to prove: (1) deliberate
indifference (2) to a serious medical need (3) that was not self-inflicted by a
prisoner who acted on his own free will.
Prisoner self-harm presents a unique and challenging problem. It is
uncomfortable to talk about and easy to ignore. But it is a serious and sad reality
that ought to be handled with care.181 The reason for closing the current loophole
is not to eliminate one of the few aspects of an inmate¶s life that he controls and
to make inmates even more vulnerable to the state¶s will. On the contrary, the
goal is to reveal how the loophole puts prisoners in danger and to offer some
ways to prevent it. If the law protects the sane manipulative self-harmer and gives
him damages in court, then there will inevitably be situations where the
reasonable prisoner will correctly calculate that self-harm is his best option,
which should never be true.
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